As the United States and China hurl toward a potential Thucydides Trap, the Chinese government has steadily laid groundwork as a global leader in emerging technologies. Maj. Bret White’s article examines Chinese thought as to that country’s place in the world: a leader in some respects; an outcast in others – but always an innovator.
Next, the article applies this thinking to the interests of China in two critical domains, outer space and cyberspace. By probing China’s vision to reshape the international legal landscape as the world becomes increasingly bipolar, space becomes fuller, and cyberwarfare expands, the article serves as a roadmap for national security practitioners and attorneys working with China.
This article examines the theory and practice of two partially contrasting policy approaches to US national security and global stability: deterrence, which has long been regarded as virtually the “Holy Grail” of post-World War II US strategy, and arms control, which offers alternative goals, procedures, and structures.
In the realm of nuclear weapons, both approaches have been regularly employed: the United States has developed and deployed a diverse array of weapons, devoting time and treasure to assembling the tools of deterrence, but it has also simultaneously pursued successive generations of SALT, START, and other diplomatic initiatives to limit and reduce those inventories. In contrast, when it comes to outer space—where there is currently a widely-shared perception of starkly rising security threats from Russia, China, and elsewhere—it is deterrence, and deterrence alone, that has been marshaled. Arms control, even relatively modest, preliminary, and non-legally binding variants, has consistently been categorically ruled off the table, by Republican and Democratic leadership alike.
David A. Koplow posits that this exclusive American reliance upon deterrence for ameliorating the security problems of space is misguided. This is because deterrence in all its assorted forms and variations is systematically less applicable to the special circumstances of exoatmospheric competition, and arms control in outer space would be particularly valuable and successful in that milieu. Koplow therefore concludes that US national policy should be promptly re-aligned, to draw strategically upon both concepts for resisting the further degradation of the security and sustainability of critical space operations.