Category Archives: International Security

FDI Like You’re FDR: CFIUS Review Under the Biden Administration’s Rooseveltian Conception of National Security

In an era where “economic security is national security,” China’s growing economic power presents America with a distinct challenge.

Will Moreland looks to America’s response to suggest that the Biden administration is returning to an earlier “Rooseveltian” conception of national security—one which appreciates that a healthy American middle class is essential to defending democracy.

Moreland finds that under that more expansive vision of national security, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) is at risk of overuse. Because Moreland fears a more cumbersome and expansive investment review is likely to harm more than help the Biden administration’s foreign policy, he proposes a narrower approach.

This narrower CFIUS approach stands in contrast to recent calls for expansive investment review—and Moreland concludes it equips today’s policy makers with the right tool for the right problem.

By, With, And Through: Section 1202 and the Future of Unconventional Warfare

As conflicts continue to be fought in countries far from the United States, it is of increasing importance that our government have the ability to train and equip foreign personnel to ensure global security. To this end, Congress enacted Section 1202 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, enabling the Department of Defense to spend up to $10 million annually to support foreign forces engaged in ongoing and authorized irregular warfare operations.

In their article, Rich, Johnson, and Shirk discuss the significant limitations of this authority, chiefly its definition of irregular warfare as “competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict,” and argue that Section 1202 is critical in allowing Special Operations Forces to counteract the aggressive actions of other nation-states through foreign personnel, while emphasizing the lack of specific authority which would allow SOF to train and equip an irregular force during a traditional armed conflict against another nation-state.

Rich, Johnson, and Shirk conclude that, while this gap may be filled through covert funds or existing emergency funds, there is still value in enacting specific authorities prior to an emergency.

Active Cyber Measures: Reviving Cold War Debunking and Deterrence Strategy

By Nicolas Aalberg

Department of Justice and National Intelligence Center reports on active cyber measures (ACMs) carried out by U.S. adversaries on social media display a staggering manipulation of American conversations, journalism, and electoral processes. Unlike Cold War active measures conducted through human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, creating or manipulating an online intelligence asset requires exponentially fewer resources and yields results with far greater scale. However, the U.S. responded to Cold War active measures through defensive counterintelligence and misinformation-debunking programs and through offensive, active HUMINT deterrents, and that same strategy can be used to combat ACMs today.

The Intelligence Community (IC) must work defensively using signals intelligence (SIGINT) and open-source intelligence (OSINT) to detect and neutralize enemy social media accounts, and Congress must create a bipartisan committee (the “Committee”) to communicate declassified information to the American public to expose manipulation of online conversations. At the same time, USCYBERCOM and CIA must work in tandem offensively through a new blend of cyber warfare and HUMINT to deter ACM proliferation and respond in kind, and once again set global military and intelligence standards on U.S. terms.

I.   Defensive Posture: Congress Must Create a Bipartisan Committee to Counter Active Cyber Measures

Given that U.S. adversaries are successfully laying siege to the fabric of American political conversations, the U.S. needs to adopt a Cold War-era defensive posture consisting of counterintelligence efforts and increased transparency with the electorate about manipulated conversations. Historically, CIA has collaborated with FBI on counterintelligence efforts to remove compromised and planted HUMINT assets. NSA, CIA, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) must similarly identify active personas and botnets through a combination of SIGINT and OSINT and collaborate with the social media industry to remove these accounts.

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