While an important part of US innovation and culture, bankruptcy proceedings have nonetheless become a unique avenue through which foreign adversaries are able to acquire sensitive US national security technologies and intellectual property. Through a detailed analysis of the current gaps in federal regulations governing foreign investment and bankruptcy proceedings in the US, Camille Stewart provides the reader an in-depth look into exactly how foreign companies have been able to circumvent these US foreign investment regulations.
In raising awareness to an issue that could ultimately leave the United States vulnerable to destructive cyberattacks, Stewart argues that training and equipping bankruptcy judges to identify potential national security concerns in bankruptcy cases will help mitigate the exfiltration of national security-related information and technology.
Since its implementation in 1981, Executive Order 12,333 has served as a general charter governing the structure and operations of the Intelligence Community. While legislation has imposed a degree of added judicial and congressional oversight, the executive branch continues to retain sole discretion over large swathes of foreign intelligence activity today.
Over the past several decades, and in accordance with E.O. 12,333’s mandate, members of the Intelligence Community have each created internal agency manuals to guide their foreign intelligence operations. These manuals identify and define a range of technical terms critical to determining the scope of agencies’ intelligence-gathering authority, including what information is gathered, how long that information is retained, and the uses to which it may be put. But over time, the dispersion of authority to make decisions within and across intelligence agencies has enabled drift in the meaning of these terms. Together, the manuals have created a thicket of often conflicting and unclear definitions that are difficult for Congress, the courts, and even committees within the executive branch to understand.
In this article, Diana Lee, Paulina Perlin, and Joe Schottenfeld provide the first sustained analysis of these definitional inconsistencies, their consequences, and efforts to address the problem from within and outside the executive branch. In particular, it focuses on three terms that determine when the intelligence cycle “officially” begins: “collection,” “acquisition,” and “targeting.” By analyzing these three terms, this Article demonstrates the lack of clarity that executive discretion and dispersal create. This lack of clarity, in turn, makes it difficult for meaningful oversight, such as congressional hearings, to occur. The Article concludes by offering recommendations to clarify the parameters of the government’s intelligence-gathering authority. As technological advancements continue to expand the Intelligence Community’s capacity to gather information, it is imperative that the government adopt measures to facilitate effective oversight over the executive’s foreign intelligence operations.
Outsourcing intelligence, while not a recent phenomenon, has become more commonplace in the face of increased operations and fiscal pressure since the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. While outsourcing has many benefits, it also brings certain general difficulties. As outsourcing decisions continue, it is critical that lawmakers understand the policy and legal implications of such choices.
Outsourcing Intelligence Analysis: Legal and Policy Risk
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) provides legal value in presenting historical and existing facts to judicial bodies in their efforts to achieve the peaceful use of the seas, consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The 2016 South China Sea Arbitration highlighted the value of GEOINT and demonstrates how GEOINT will be important in promoting a rules-based order in the maritime domain.
Rock or Island: It Was an UNCLOS Call
In his essay on domestic surveillance, Philip Heymann explores the ways in which technological advancements have changed expectations of privacy and the legal protections against government intrusion. He outlines current constitutional and other legal protections, including evolving limitations on government activity that could be considered not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. Heymann concludes with predictions about the future balance between citizens’ demands for privacy and the government need for information.