David Jonas and Dyllan Taxman’s insightful article— “JCP-No-Way: A Critique Of The Iran Nuclear Deal As A Non-Legally-Binding Political Commitment” —examines the Iran Nuclear Deal and its place in prior US arms treaties.
By positioning the Iran Nuclear Deal within the historical context of past agreements, American treaty-making, and national and international political norms, the authors conclude that the use of a non-binding political commitment to rein in Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions was both novel and inappropriate.
Instead, the authors argue that the Obama Administration should have used one of the available legally binding agreement options when negotiating with Iran. While the Trump Administration has since withdrawn from the Iran Nuclear Deal, this article highlights the importance of the US prioritizing future arms agreements that carry the force of law.
JCP No Way: A Critique of the Iran Nuclear Deal
The business that we are all somehow associated with—of contemplating war, preparing for war, deterring war, initiating war, prosecuting war, providing relief in war, ending war, recovering from war—is consequential. Getting as right as possible the intricate dance of decisions that define the initiation, conduct, and conclusion of warfare is incredibly important for societies. It also has varying degrees of impact on individuals, from merely defining the outlines of individual service members’ daily lives to shattering or ending the mental and physical existence of combatants and innocents.
In this article, Sasha Romanosky and Zachary Goldman address the problem of how to define “collateral damage” in the cyber realm. Arguing that unintended effects on data alone can constitute collateral damage, Romanosky and Goldman propose ways for the US military and law enforcement to conceptualize and estimate collateral damage in the context of cyber operations.
Understanding Cyber Collateral Damage
In this article, Anthony Pfaff discusses what ethical norms should govern proxy war and the relationships that sustain them; the way the existence of a benefactor-proxy relationship complicates the application of traditional jus ad bellum criteria; and the additional moral problems caused by the way proxy wars shift risk away from benefactors. He concludes by suggesting a set of norms that should guide proxy relationships.
In coalition operations, individual States may be responsible in law for some, but not all, of the activities conducted, and coalition members will often have different legal obligations or varying interpretations of the same obligations. In this article, David S. Goddard explores the challenges of achieving legal interoperability—the effective managing of these differences— and suggests a framework for understanding and addressing this problem.