The development of a counterterrorism enterprise after Sept. 11, 2001, has seen over the course of nearly 20 years both tactical successes and strategic obstacles.
Matthew Levitt frames this overview of counterterrorism policy by observing that the current focus on Great Power and near power competition as US national security priorities reflects the success of Washington’s investment in counterterrorism and homeland security. However, the current environment of growing partisan polarization also reflects the need to rationalize US investment in counterterrorism and adopt a more sustainable posture on the counterterrorism mission.
By building on the role of counterterrorism within interstate conflict, observing the importance of an investment in alliances and partnerships, and assessing the budgeting for counterterrorism programs, Levitt builds a foundation to support his concluding strategic recommendations for a review and reorientation of US counterterrorism.
Warfare has transformed in the modern age from traditional warfare to more states engaging in non-international armed conflict, like the so called “war on terror.” However, the United States adheres to a standard regarding the end of non-international armed conflicts that deviates from the various approaches of international law practitioners and scholars.
In this article, Christian Schaller both questions the U.S. policy and argues it lacks clarity and transparency while also acknowledging the power it gives decision makers in combating terror, a strategy that more states have come to appreciate.
Legal analysis of the now much maligned “war on terror” has been a growth industry since the events of September 11, 2001. Despite this, how best to respond to and regulate terrorism remains a contested debate intellectually and practically. This article dives into that empirical gap by providing unique data on the operation of detention, arrest, and trial regimes created to counter and manage terrorism in the United Kingdom.