Category Archives: Defense Policy

Over-the Horizon Drone Strikes in an Ongoing Global War: Afghanistan and Beyond

Laura A. Dickinson discusses the challenges and limitations of applying domestic and international legal frameworks, including jus ad bellum and international human rights law, as the US conducts over the horizon, unmanned aerial vehicle operations, while US officials provide conflicting statements on whether the US remains at war.

Dickinson examines Mitt Regan’s book Drone Strike: Analyzing the Impacts of Targeted Killing [see also Regan’s article in this volume] and discusses the book’s significance in gathering important data to understand the actual effectiveness of drones strikes in combating al Qaeda and associated groups and the impact of these drone strikes on civilians.

Dickinson then discusses why the national security community might go beyond that data and reconsider the international and domestic legal paradigms under which drone strikes occur. She argues that we need to do more than simply change our understanding of how drones and their impacts fit within the law of armed conflict but rather consider a broader paradigm shift.

By allowing the executive branch to skirt legal rules that might limit such extraterritorial uses of force, drones contribute to ongoing declarations of wars with no geographical loci and no temporal endpoints. Thus, Dickinson concludes that from the perspectives of international and domestic law, the ongoing use of drone strikes must be studied not only for its effects on the ground but also for its effects on the rule of law more generally.

The First Calling Forth Clause: The Constitution’s Non-Emergency Power to Call Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws

Alden Fletcher analyzes the historical origins and intent behind the Constitution’s “Calling Forth Clause” that has served as a foundation for confiding vast military authority in the president and potentially allowing the use of military force against civilians. While scholars have interpreted the Clause’s original meaning as requiring violent resistance to the laws before military force may be brought to bear, Fletcher shows that evidence from English, colonial, and founding-era history reveals the Clause was designed without such narrow constraints.

But historical evidence also suggests Congress and the judiciary could be intimately involved in the decision of deploying military forces domestically. Fletcher thus concludes that the founding era history both supports broad permission of the federal government to use troops domestically, as well as a significant ability of Congress and the courts to check the executive’s use of military force, even in a crisis.

Outsourcing the Cyber Kill Chain: Reinforcing the Cyber Mission Force and Allowing Increased Contractor Support of Cyber Operations

The United States is under a growing and constant threat of cyberattack. US cybersecurity strategy has evolved in response, adapting to the new threat climate by committing US Cyber Command to more aggressive and persistent peacetime cyber operations. However, the Department of Defense Cyber Mission Force (CMF) has been stretched thin attempting to carry out its new mission, requiring additional commitments to resourcing, force size, and capabilities.

Homer A. La Rue argues that increased participation of private contractors in US cyber operations is the best way to bolster the CMF’s capabilities, at least in the short term. Contractors may be particularly useful in “gray-zone” operations, that is, operation in the area that exists beyond the threshold of conventional diplomacy but falls short of conventional war.

Although there are challenges and risks to increased contractor participation in cyber operations—particularly related to command and control—La Rue argues that methods of managing these risks already exist and that the benefits of outsourcing cyber operations outweighs the risks.