Meyer and Berenbaum analyze the national security policy challenge in balancing protections for Intelligence Community whistleblowers and the government’s legitimate need for secrecy in order to execute the federal intelligence and counterintelligence mission. It is that need for secrecy that creates the intellectual distance between the sovereign’s requirement for information regarding the performance of the federal intelligence and counterintelligence mission and the ability to conduct that mission.
George Ellard, the National Security Agency’s Inspector General, provides his insight into the true damage caused by the Snowden disclosures, with comparisons to both recent and distant past leaks.
Bowman “sets the record straight” with his review of Bob Gates’ new book, Duty. He states that Duty is not a “tell all,” but rather a highly personal and almost daily reflection of what Gates thought and experienced during his time as US Secretary of Defense. Ultimately, Bowman concludes that while the book is very readable, it is primarily a catharsis with little to no commentary on national security or international law.
Lin explores the phenomenon of overclassification in American society and proposes a classification cost metric in order to create serious economic incentives to reduce classification. The metric would provide decision makers with a way to judge the relative importance of different classified documents and allow officials to classify documents on a more objective scale. The author relates a number of questions and answers relating to the underlying approach, the mechanics, budget and finance, and law and policy, thereby parsing out the strengths and weaknesses of his proposal.
Paramilitary operations – “PM ops” in American spytalk – may be defined as secret war-like activities. They are a part of a broader set of endeavors undertaken by intelligence agencies to manipulate events abroad, when so ordered by authorities in the executive branch. These activities are known collectively as “covert action” (CA) or, alternatively, “special activities,” “the quiet option,” or “the third option” (between diplomacy and overt military intervention). In addition to PM ops, CA includes secret political and economic operations, as well as the use of propaganda. Often
used synergically, each form is meant to help nudge the course of history – insofar as this is possible – in a direction favorable to the United States. Since the creation of the modern U.S. “intelligence community” by way of the National Security Act of 1947, PM ops have been conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), known by insiders as “The Agency.”
This article offers a brief history of America’s paramilitary activities, with special attention to the relationship between intelligence analysis – the attempts by the CIA and its fifteen companion agencies to understand contemporary world events and forecast how they will unfold – and the use of paramilitary forces to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals.