From the perspective of private industry, Mieke Eoyang examines the interplay between US national security electronic surveillance and the US telecommunications companies that are necessary intermediaries for this surveillance, tracing the history of major surveillance programs and identifying key areas of tension. Eoyang recommends reforms including a court process for government access to overseas data on foreign customers, leaving bulk, unfiltered data in the hands of private industry, and working with close allies to build consensus around electronic surveillance norms.
In coalition operations, individual States may be responsible in law for some, but not all, of the activities conducted, and coalition members will often have different legal obligations or varying interpretations of the same obligations. In this article, David S. Goddard explores the challenges of achieving legal interoperability—the effective managing of these differences— and suggests a framework for understanding and addressing this problem.
Michael Schmitt and Christopher Ford unpack the Trump Administration’s legal justifications for the April 2017 United States attack on a Syrian airfield in response to its use of chemical weapons against civilians. Schmitt and Ford discuss three possible legal bases for the use of force: self-defense, response to an internationally wrongful act, and humanitarian intervention. The authors conclude that the US’s actions run afoul of limitations in each relevant body of law, and of note, they discuss how this attack is consequential for the validity of humanitarian intervention on another state’s territory without approval from the UN Security Council. They conclude by suggesting that the international community is likely to consider the nature of suffering, in addition to the quantum of suffering, as bearing on the right of States to mount future humanitarian operations.
- Assessing US Justifications for Using Force in Response to Syria’s Chemical Attacks: An International Law Perspective