Tag Archives: Teaching National Security Law

Blueprint for Law School Engagement with the Military

In Grutter v. Bollinger, law student amici provided significant support for the University of Michigan’s use of race as a factor in law school admissions. Although Grutter did not specifically refer to any of the briefs submitted by law students, the Court’s reliance on diversity interests echoed the students’ emphasis on the educational benefits of a diverse classroom and the instrumental benefits of a diverse legal profession. On the whole, the Court’s analysis in Grutter broke relatively little new ground, since it closely followed Justice Powell’s endorsement of diversity as a compelling interest in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke twenty-five years earlier.

Why a Journal of National Security Law & Policy?

New periodicals and law journals, if not commonplace, are still far from unknown. The arrival of this inaugural issue of the Journal of National Security Law & Policy is particularly noteworthy, however, because of the circumstances that have produced it and the need it seeks to address: bringing national security practitioners, lawyers, and scholars into conversation about the evolving relationship between law and national security. It is worth reflecting on the circumstances that make the arrival of this new journal so timely and important.

The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code

Two innovative federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. §2339A and §2339B, have been frequently charged in prosecutions since September 11, 2001, becoming key elements in the government’s anti-terrorism efforts. Section 2339A makes it a federal crime knowingly to provide material support or resources in preparation for or in carrying out specified crimes of terrorism. Section 2339B prohibits knowingly providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. These statutes bear some resemblance to criminal liability for complicity, but they are being used like a new kind of conspiracy charge, the familiar “prosecutor’s darling.” Unlike conspiracy, they are framed with a mens rea of knowledge rather than of purpose, and because they are substantive offenses, they can be combined with traditional conspiracy charges. These provisions can be used to impose punishment for conduct remote from the commission of criminal harms, often conduct involving minimal and outwardly non-criminal acts.