1. Human Rights First: Two reports concerning detention policy in Afghanistan
HRF released two reports on detention issues in Afghanistan today. Here is the press release.
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/usls/2009/alert/527/index.htm
Fixing Bagram: Strengthening Detention Reforms to Align with U.S. Strategic Priorities.
This policy paper analyzes the detention reforms undertaken by the Obama administration in September 2009 and provides recommendations on further reforms that are needed to bring U.S. detention practices in accordance with international law and to further U.S. counterinsurgency goals.
Undue Process: An Examination of Detention and Trials of Bagram Detainees in April 2009.
This report is based on research in Afghanistan in April 2009 where we interviewed former Bagram detainees held by the U.S. military and describes how they were captured, treated, and what means were available to them to challenge their detention. The report also contains our recommendations submitted to the Detention Task Force, CENTCOM, and Department of Defense in May 2009.
2. United States v. Buddenberg (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2009) (denying constitutional challenge to Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act)
What’s that you say? Haven’t heard of the AETA, aka 18 USC 43? It’s a pretty interesting statute, and the court in this instance (Judge Whyte) rejected a series of facial constitutional challenges to it involving overbreadth, vagueness, and First Amendment claims. I reprint the whole thing below, in case anyone is interested:
(Cite as: 2009 WL 3485937 (N.D.Cal.))
United States District Court, N.D. California,Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
San Jose Division.
UNITED STATES, Plaintiff,
v.
Joseph BUDDENBERG, Maryam Khajavi, Nathan Pope a/k/a Nathan Knoerl, and Adriana
Stumpo, Defendants.
No. CR-09-00263 RMW.
Oct. 28, 2009.
J. Tony Serra, Kali Saveria Grech, Omar C. Figueroa, Robert Jay Bloom, James McNair Thompson, Thomas Joseph Nolan, Jr, Rachel Anne Meeropol, for Defendants.
Elise Becker, Grant P. Fondo, for United States.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
RONALD M. WHYTE, District Judge.
*1 Defendants Joseph Buddenberg, Maryam Khajavi, Nathan Pope, and Adriana Stumpo (collectively “defendants”) move to dismiss the indictment charging them under the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“AETA”), 18 U.S.C. § 43 with using a facility of interstate commerce to interfere with an animal enterprise and in connection therewith intentionally placing a person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. Defendants contend that the AETA is “unconstitutional on its face in that it is impermissibly overbroad and vague.” Def. Stumpo’s Mot. to Dis., p. iv. The United States opposes the motions, arguing that: (1) the defendants lack standing to the extent that they challenge the constitutionality of sections of the AETA with which they are not charged with violating; and (2) the provisions of the AETA with which defendants are charged with violating are not facially unconstitutional. For the reasons stated below, the court denies the motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 19, 2008, the United States filed a criminal complaint alleging that defendants participated in a series of threatening demonstrations at the homes of a number of UC Berkeley and UC Santa Cruz professors who conduct bio-medical research involving the use of animals. Because defendants’ present motions seek dismissal only on the basis of the AETA’s purported facial unconstitutionality, a detailed description of defendants’ alleged conduct is not necessary.
On March 9, 2009, the defendants were charged by indictment with using, and conspiring to use, [FN1] an interstate facility to damage and interfere with the operation of an animal enterprise and in connection with that purpose intentionally placing a person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. Although the indictment does not expressly identify the specific subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 43 which is charged, the indictment tracks essentially verbatim the language of §§ 43(a)(1) and (2)(B). Count Two reads in pertinent part that defendants:
FN1. The conspiracy charge is brought under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and not under 18 U.S.C. §§ 43(a)(1) and 2(C). There is no apparent reason for this choice.
used and caused to be used a facility of interstate commerce, for the purpose of damaging and interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise, and in connection with that purpose did intentionally place and attempt to place a person in reasonable fear of death of [sic ], and serious bodily injury to that person, a member of the immediate family of that person, and a spouse and intimate partner of that person by a course of conduct involving threats, acts of vandalism, property damage, criminal trespass, harassment, and intimidation, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 43.
Indictment ¶ 3. Count One alleges that defendants conspired in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
18 U.S.C. § 43(a) defines the conduct constituting offenses under the AETA:
(a) Offense.–Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes to be used the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce–
(1) for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise; and
*2 (2) in connection with such purpose–
(A) intentionally damages or causes the loss of any real or personal property (including animals or records) used by an animal enterprise, or any real or personal property of a person or entity having a connection to, relationship with, or transactions with an animal enterprise;
(B) intentionally places a person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to that person, a member of the immediate family (as defined in section 115) of that person, or a spouse or intimate partner of that person by a course of conduct involving threats, acts of vandalism, property damage, criminal trespass, harassment, or intimidation; or
(C) conspires or attempts to do so;
shall be punished as provided for in subsection (b).
Section 43(b) of the AETA sets forth the penalties for various types of violations. For a violation of § 43(a)(2)(B) that results in no bodily injury the maximum sentence is five years of imprisonment; for a violation resulting in substantial bodily injury the maximum is ten years; for a violation resulting serious bodily injury the maximum is twenty years; and for a violation resulting death the maximum is life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 43(b)(2)-(5).
The AETA concludes with “Rules of Construction” which provide in relevant part that:
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed–“:
(1) to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal prohibition by the First Amendment to the Constitution; [or]
(2) to create new remedies for interference with activities protected by the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution, regardless of the point of view expressed, or to limit any existing legal remedies for such interference ….
II. ANALYSIS
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment argues that various terms used in 18 U.S.C. § 43 make it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Defendants do not currently argue that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, but reserve the right to later bring such a challenge. Def. Stumpo’s Mot. to Dismiss 3 n. 1.
A. Defendants’ Standing to Challenge Subsections Not Charged in the Indictment
The government argues that because the indictment only charges defendants with the offense set forth in §§ 43(a)(1) and (2)(B) and with the attempt to commit that offense under (2)(C), defendants lack standing to challenge any overbroad or unconstitutionally vague terms in § 43(a)(2)(A) or § 43(a)(2)(C). Section 43(a)(2)(A) proscribes using an interstate facility for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal facility and in connection with such purpose intentionally damaging, or causing the loss of, property used by the animal enterprise or having a connection to an animal enterprise. Section 43(a)(2)(B) does not deal with actual loss of property or property damage. Rather, a violation of § 43(a)(2)(B) requires the intentional placement of a person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. Defendants are charged with intentionally placing a person in fear of death or serious bodily injury. They are not charged with damaging or causing the loss of property.
*3 The government cites Serv. Employees Int’l. Union, Local 3 v. Mun. of Mt. Lebanon, 446 F.3d 419, 424 (3rd Cir.2006), where the Third Circuit held that plaintiff SEIU lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the portion of a city ordinance requiring registration with the city police before engaging in door-to-door solicitation. Although the ordinance also required registration before engaging in canvassing, the union could only challenge theregistration before canvassing portion of the ordinance as that was the only conduct in which it had or intended to engage.
We are not free to hear a party’s facial challenge to a municipal regulation that is wholly inapplicable to the party. While the canvassing registration requirement and the solicitation permitting requirements are both found within the ordinance, they clearly establish distinct and independent requirements for their application. Overbreadth doctrine effectively allows a party to challenge separate and hypothetical applications of a regulation only when an otherwise valid application of that same regulation causes the party injury-in-fact. It does not allow a party to challenge a regulation that is wholly inapplicable to the party, regardless of the regulation’s location in the statute books.
Id. at 424-5.
Defendants contend that they are entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the AETA on the basis that any portion of it is overbroad or vague whether or not they have been charged with violating the allegedly overbroad or vague provision. Defendants argue that SEIU should not be applied to criminal cases and that unlike the situation in SEIU where the union was not and would not be engaged in soliciting, there is no guarantee that defendants could not be charged with additional substantive violations of the AETA. They also note that the indictment does not specify a particular subsection of the AETA with which defendants are charged. Defendants point to Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) in which the Supreme Court explained that there are exceptions to the traditional rule that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others. Id. at 610-615. Defendants specifically refer to language in Broadrick stating that litigants may be allowed to challenge a statute where the court may predict or assume that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.Id. at 611- 12.
The court is not persuaded by defendants’ standing argument. First, the indictment, despite referring to 18 U.S.C. § 43 rather than to any specific subsection, clearly only charges defendants with a violation of §§ 43(a)(1) and(a)(2)(B)–including an attempt to do so–and participating in a conspiracy to violate those sections. There is no indication that defendants intentionally caused damage or loss of property thereby violating §§ 43(a)(1) and (2)(A). Second, although defendants in a criminal case have a right to raise the constitutional claims of third parties as well as their own, they still must show injury in fact. See United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir.1992). A defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to “insist that his conduct be judged in accordance with a rule that is constitutionally valid.” Id. However, a facial challenge cannot be based upon provisions of a statute which caused them no injury and with which they have neither been charged nor threatened to be charged. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 609-10 (1973); SEIU, 446 F.3d at 424-25.
*4 Defendants lack standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of §§ 43(a)(1) and (2)(A) of the AETA. Accordingly, defendants’ facial challenge is limited to a challenge of the constitutionality of the provisions of the AETA with which they are charged, specifically§§ 43(a)(1) and (2)(B) and 43(a) (1) and (2)(C) (attempt).
B. Overbreadth
Defendants assert that the AETA interferes with their constitutional rights of free speech and expression. Although statutes which burden First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and not cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression (Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612), the AETA’s focus is not on speech but rather on conduct. A statute is facially overbroad when its application to protected speech is “substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of the law’s plainly legitimate applications.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119-20 (2003). But as the Court noted in Hicks, a facial overbreadth challenge will “[r]arely, if ever, succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily associated with speech.” Id. at 124. That is, when a statute is not aimed primarily at speech, an overbreadth challenge is more difficult to show.Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 931 (9th Cir.2009).
The provisions of the AETA with which defendants are charged are not specifically addressed to speech or conduct necessarily associated with speech. Those subsections address conduct that involves the use of any interstate facility and is undertaken for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operation of an animal facility. The violation charged against defendants requires an intentional course of conduct involving “threats, acts of vandalism, property damage, criminal trespass, harassment, or intimidation” that place a person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(B). A person could violate the statute without engaging in speech.
The provisions of the AETA at issue in this case could potentially affect speech in a very limited way in that the statute does proscribe threats which intentionally place a person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(B). However, “a true threat, that is one where a reasonable person would foresee that the listener will believe he will be subjected to physical violence upon his person, is unprotected by the first amendment.” Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir.2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A true threat is what the AETA describes.
“In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court’s first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.”Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). Furthermore, “where conduct and not merely speech is implicated the overbreadth of a statute must be judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). The defendants bear the burden of proof in demonstrating substantial overbreadth. New York State Club Ass ‘n., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988).
*5 By their terms, §§ 43(a)(1) and (2)(B) criminalize a course of conduct undertaken for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operation of an animal enterprise and which intentionally places a person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury by threats, acts of vandalism, etc. In Humanitarian Law Project, 552 F.3d at 931-32, the court considered the constitutionality of restrictions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) against “providing material support or resources to a designated organization.” Id. at 932. The court concludedthat
although Plaintiffs may be able to identify particular instances of protected speech that may fall within the statute, those instances are not substantial when compared to the legitimate applications of section 2339B(a).
Thus, because AEDPA section 2339B is not aimed at expressive conduct and because it does not cover a substantial amount of protected speech, we hold that the prohibition against providing “material support or resources” to a foreign terrorist organization is not facially overbroad.
Id. Similarly, the AETA is aimed at holding accountable individuals intending to damage or interfere with the operation of animal enterprises from intentionally placing people in fear of death or serious injury. Since §§ 43(a)(1) and (2)(B) do not cover a substantial amount of protected speech, they are not overbroad.
C. Vagueness
“A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 732. “A law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on its face as unduly vague, in violation of due process. To succeed, however, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497. Moreover, “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).
D. Defendants’ Specific Claims of Overbreadth and Vagueness
1. Defendants Fail to Identify a Hypothetical Example of Conduct that Would Fall within the Terms of § 43(a)(2)(B) and Would Constitute Protectable Expression
Before considering the particular provisions that defendants offer as the source of their overbreadth challenge to § 43(a)(2) (B), the court notes that nowhere in defendants’ moving papers do they provide an example of conduct that would fall within the terms of § 43(a)(2)(B) but would be protectable expression under the First Amendment. And indeed, in light of the well-established rule that the First Amendment does not protect certain categories of expression (e.g., fighting words, incitements to violence, and true threats [FN2]), it is difficult to imagine an example of activity which would violate § 43(a)(2)(B) but be constitutionally protected.
FN2. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that a state may punish those words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding that fighting words–“those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction”–are generally proscribable); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment permits a ban on “true threats”).
2. Use of the Language “Damaging … an Animal Enterprise,” “Damages … Personal Property” and “Economic Damage” in the AETA Does Not Render § 43(a)(1) and (2)(B) Unconstitutionally Overbroad
*6 Defendants contend that the AETA is substantially overbroad because its prohibitions against “damaging … an animal enterprise,” “damages … personal property” and “economic damages” criminally sanction protected activity. As pointed out above, the subsections charged against defendants impose criminal sanctions on conduct, not protected speech or activity. Defendants assert that “damages” may include lost business profits or business goodwill and that protected activity such as lawful picketing of an animal enterprise could cause that enterprise to lose profits or business goodwill. However, the charged subsections of the AETA cannot be construed so as to expose a lawful picketer or animal rights advocate to criminal sanctions because the conduct required for a violation must be both for the purpose of damaging the operations of an animal enterprise and done intentionally to cause reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury.
The alleged overbreadth of the “damaging” terms would appear at most to relate to punishment for violations of §§ of 43(a)(1) and (2)(A). The AETA contains a definition of “economic damages,” which includes “the replacement costs of lost or damaged property or records, the costs of repeating an interrupted or invalidated experiment, the loss of profits, or increased costs.” 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(3). The phrase “economic damages,” however, only appears in the “Penalties” section of the statute, where greater penalties are permitted for greater amounts of economic damages. The indictment does not charge the defendants with any penalty based upon an amount of “economic damages.” Defendants’ worry appears to be that in a particular case lost profits could result from protected activity. But the language of the statute is important: penalty increases occur when “the offense results in economic damage” of varying amounts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 43(b)(2)(A),43(b)(3) (A), 43(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added). “The offense” refers to the intentional acts specified in § 43(a)(2)(A) and 43(a)(2)(B). Any economic damages that factor into the penalty must result from the violation, not from other conduct that might take place simultaneously (e.g., at a demonstration where protected and criminal conduct occurs). Thus, the “economic damage” penalty provisions do not render the statute overbroad. In the instant case, defendants are not even charged with a violation that requires there be property damages or loss of property. Defendants argument that the term “economic damages” renders the statute unconstitutionally overbroad appears applicable, if at all, only to § 43(a)(2)(A). The court concludes that “economic damages,” as used in the penalties section, does not reach a substantial amount of protected speech or expression and is irrelevant to the charge here that involves § 43(a)(2)(B).
3. Any Vagueness in “Damaging … an Animal Enterprise,” “Damages … Personal Property” and “Economic Damage” Only Applies to Uncharged Subsections
*7 Defendants contend that the statute’s definition of “economic damages” renders it unconstitutionally vague. As discussed above, the indictment charging the defendants does not allege any “economic damages.” Therefore, whether a charge that included alleged “economic damages” would be vague has no effect on someone charged only with a violation under §§ 43(a)(1) and (2)(B).
4. “Interfering” with the Operation of an Animal Enterprise Is Not Overbroad Or Vague
Defendants argue that the AETA’s term “interfering” renders the statute facially overbroad. But defendants begin with an erroneous premise. Defendants state that § 43(a)(1) “prohibits ‘interfering’ with an animal enterprise.” Def. Stumpo’s Mot. to Dis., p. 12. This misstates the statute’s clear import.Interfering with animal enterprises alone is not prohibited. Rather, the statute prohibits damaging or interfering with the operations and “in connection with such purpose” intentionally damaging or causing the loss of property or engaging in a course of conduct to place a person in fear of death or injury. 18 U.S.C. §§ 43(a)(1), (2)(A), and (2)(B).
Section 43(a) (2)(B) of the AETA, then, is distinct from a few statutes where, on the basis of words like “interfere,” unconstitutional overbreadth has been found. For example, in City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987), the Court invalidated a statute that made it “unlawful for any person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty, or any person summoned to aid in making an arrest.”Id. at 455 (quoting Code of Ordinances, City of Houston, Texas § 34-11(a)). At issue in City of Houston was the prohibition of “in any manner … interrupt[ing] any policeman” which, as the court wrote, “is admittedly violated scores of times daily, yet only some individuals–those chosen by the police in their unguided discretion–are arrested.” Id. And in Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir.1988), the Second Circuit invalidated a Connecticut statute that prohibited “interfering with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person ….”Id. at 433. The court concluded that statutory terms like “interfere” and “harass” could not be justified as reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. Id. at 437 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988)). The statutes inHill and Dorman, in prohibiting “interrupting” a policeman and “interfering” with a hunter, directly proscribe vast swathes of conduct, much of it expressive. The AETA, on the other hand, provides that intentionally placing a person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, with the purpose of interfering with an animal enterprise, violates the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(B). Because of the limits on proscribed conduct in § 43(a)(2)(B), the AETA’s use of “interfere” is much narrower than in Hill andDorman.
*8 The Court upheld a similarly structured statute in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), where the challenged ordinance stated that “[a] person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: … (f) Congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse.”Id. at 111. In this ordinance, the broad terms, “to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,” specify the necessary intent, not the substantive conduct the statute prohibits. The same is true for the AETA.
As the Ninth Circuit wrote in United States v. Wilfong, “[t]o ‘interfere’ is to ‘oppose, intervene, hinder, or prevent.’ WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 704 (3d College ed.1998). ‘Interfere’ has such a clear, specific and well-known meaning as not to require more than the use of the word itself in a criminal statute.”274 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotes omitted) (citing United States v. Gwyther, 431 F.2d 1142, 1144 n. 2 (9th Cir.1970)). Defendants provide no basis for the AETA’s use of “interfere” not being susceptible to this interpretation, and the court therefore concludes that the required purpose of “interfering with an animal enterprise” does not render the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.
Defendants’ argument that the use of the word “interfering” renders the statute unconstitutionally vague is easily dispatched. Defendants provide no basis for concluding that the AETA’s use of “interfere” is different than that discussed in Wilfong. In their reply, defendants argue that the usages of “interference” in Wilfong and United States v. Bucher, 375 F.3d 929 (9th Cir.2004) are constrained by the statutes’ provision of the “sort of interference that is punishable.” Defs.’ Reply 8. Those cases upheld statutes that prohibited interference with a forest officer and a government employee, respectively.Wilfong, 274 F.3d at 1299; Bucher, 375 F.3d at 931. According to defendants, the definition of “animal enterpise” is so broad that “interference is not bound by any statutory context” and the statute thus fails to provide defendants with fair notice. Defs.’ Reply 8. Although defendants correctly note that the statutory definition of “animal enterprise” is broad, [FN3] it is not unclear. Defendants appear to be concerned that the Act’s requirement that charged conduct be undertaken “for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise” is easily satisfied. Defendants are correct that a wide variety of expressive and non-expressive conduct might plausibly be undertaken with the purpose of interfering with an animal enterprise–a public protest, for example, or a private decision not to patronize a particular business–but that conduct is not prohibited under § 43(a)(2)(B). The purpose requirement is merely one element of the offense. Beyond asserting that defendants have no notice of what conduct is prohibited, they provide no basis to conclude that the statute’s purpose requirement is vague.