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	<title>Journal of National Security Law &#38; Policy &#187; Michael J. Woods</title>
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	<description>The world&#039;s only peer-reviewed journal devoted exclusively to national security law and policy.</description>
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		<title>An Assessment of the Evolution and Oversight of Defense Counterintelligence Activities</title>
		<link>http://jnslp.com/2009/12/15/an-assessment-of-the-evolution-and-oversight-of-defense-counterintelligence-activities/</link>
		<comments>http://jnslp.com/2009/12/15/an-assessment-of-the-evolution-and-oversight-of-defense-counterintelligence-activities/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Dec 2009 17:45:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Michael J. Woods</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Secrecy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Teaching National Security Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vol. 3 No. 1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War on Terror]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[feature]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://jnslp.com/?p=311</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[For more than thirty years, our country has struggled to delineate the boundaries of domestic intelligence operations. Americans tend to regard those government components exercising national security powers within the borders of the United States (whether under clear authority or not) with an inherent suspicion bolstered by historical experience. We tolerate the existence of such components but insist that they be highly regulated, particularly with respect to any activities that impinge upon civil society. Historical circumstances influence, but never erase, this regulatory imperative. Despite this imperative, components may occasionally escape regulation – at least for a time – because they are unknown, their missions remain mysterious or only partially understood, or because (intentionally or not) a convincing illusion of sufficient regulation is presented to the examining eye.]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For more than thirty years, our country has struggled to delineate the boundaries of domestic intelligence operations. Americans tend to regard those government components exercising national security powers within the borders of the United States (whether under clear authority or not) with an inherent suspicion bolstered by historical experience. We tolerate the existence of such components but insist that they be highly regulated, particularly with respect to any activities that impinge upon civil society. Historical circumstances influence, but never erase, this regulatory imperative. Despite this imperative, components may occasionally escape regulation – at least for a time – because they are unknown, their missions remain mysterious or only partially understood, or because (intentionally or not) a convincing illusion of sufficient regulation is presented to the examining eye.</p>
<div class="wam_wrap"><h4 class="wam">Attached Files:</h4><ul class="wam_ul"><li><a href='http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/05-Woods-Kings-V13-11-23-09.pdf' class='wam_link'>An Assessment of the Evolution and Oversight of Defense Counterintelligence Activities</a></li></ul></div>
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		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
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		<title>Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215</title>
		<link>http://jnslp.com/2005/06/15/counterintelligence-and-access-to-transactional-records-a-practical-history-of-usa-patriot-act-section-215/</link>
		<comments>http://jnslp.com/2005/06/15/counterintelligence-and-access-to-transactional-records-a-practical-history-of-usa-patriot-act-section-215/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Jun 2005 19:07:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Michael J. Woods</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Laws of War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vol. 1 No. 1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War on Terror]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[feature]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://jnslp.com/?p=445</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The USA PATRIOT Act has sparked intense public debate, with proponents claiming that the Act is a necessarily hard-minded response to a national crisis, while opponents see unwarranted, even opportunistic, expansion of state power. Perhaps no provision of the Act has generated more controversy than §215, which authorizes the FBI to seek a court order compelling the production of “any tangible things” relevant to certain counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. Like many other provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, §215 will expire on December 31, 2005, unless reauthorized by Congress. The controversy, therefore, is likely to intensify over the coming months.]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The USA PATRIOT Act has sparked intense public debate, with proponents claiming that the Act is a necessarily hard-minded response to a national crisis, while opponents see unwarranted, even opportunistic, expansion of state power. Perhaps no provision of the Act has generated more controversy than §215, which authorizes the FBI to seek a court order compelling the production of “any tangible things” relevant to certain counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. Like many other provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, §215 will expire on December 31, 2005, unless reauthorized by Congress. The controversy, therefore, is likely to intensify over the coming months.</p>
<div class="wam_wrap"><h4 class="wam">Attached Files:</h4><ul class="wam_ul"><li><a href='http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/03_Woods_Master.pdf' class='wam_link'>Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215</a></li></ul></div>
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